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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the crisis at the core of global finance provoked a "sudden stop/reversal" in private capital flows toward emerging-market economies (EMEs). This followed a bonanza episode that saw at its final stage an unprecedented "decoupling" surge in 2007. While the global financial crisis (GFC) hit EMEs quite indiscriminately, differences were observed in relative vulnerability to the global shock. Similarly, while a "two-speed recovery" describes an important divide between EMEs and advanced economies in general, experiences among EMEs again show considerable diversity. Broadly speaking, the most important factors determining countries' recovery fortunes were their precrisis external positions and their policy space, defining their respective scope for implementing stimulus measures. Countries that were dependent on external help (International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, etc) and export recovery generally fared worse. As financial globalization has severely reduced EMEs policy space and increased their vulnerability, the attractiveness of defensive macroeconomic policies designed to counter these adverse conditions rose accordingly. This paper investigates whether capital account management (CAM) may contribute to shoring up EMEs' macroeconomic and financial stability and enlarging their policy space while avoiding the costs associated with "self-insurance" strategies. Focusing on the BRICs, insights concerning the design of effective capital account management regimes are sought.
Section 2 critiques the idea of financial globalization as a development strategy supposed to foster catching up. While any supposed benefits may be illusory rather than real, financial globalization has important downsides: the periphery gets coupled to the monetary policy stance set at the center while risking financial instability through exposure to global financial conditions. Section 3 weighs the options available to EMEs in the light of the crisis experiences and global developments. Especially in the absence of fundamental reform of the international order, instead of taking recourse to self-insurance as the apparent default option, EMEs should explore CAM, the underlying rationale and principles of which are discussed in section 4. Section 5 investigates the BRICs experiences in the GFC. Section 6 concludes.
FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND US MONETARY POLICY
In the 1980s, liberalizing financial markets including cross-border capital flows and asset holdings became a policy mantra around the world. Promoted by international organizations such as the IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and European Union (EU), the "Washington Consensus" strongly influenced policies in many developing countries (Abdelal 2007) . The main argument put forward for liberalizing capital flows stresses relative capital scarcity in poor countries, in the sense of a lack of domestic saving. By opening up their capital accounts, developing economies gain access to the large saving pool of advanced economies, allowing welfare-enhancing augmentations of their own insufficient home savings, supposedly leading to higher investment.
Other promises feature enhanced microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stability arising as so-called "indirect or collateral benefits" (Prasad and Rajan 2008) .
Microeconomic efficiency gains occur as developing economies' incomplete and underdeveloped financial markets are exposed to foreign competition, with capital inflows driven by foreign expertise promoting efficiency in resource allocation. Competitive pressures and foreign expertise also deliver macroeconomic stability gains, as the presumed wisdom of markets disciplines policymakers and encourages better institutions and practices. As individuals and firms are offered an enlarged set of opportunities for risk diversification, economies are supposed to experience greater stability in consumption and investment. As a consequence of closing the supposed "saving gap" and obtaining guidance from "wise finance," financially integrating developing economies experience rising investment rates and accelerated catching-up. "Cross-border flows spur growth and development, benefiting everyone" (BIS 2011).
At varying degrees, financial globalization has become a reality in many developing countries; welcomed by market players keen to explore the opportunities on offer in newly opened "emerging markets." Actual outcomes have been sobering. Most irritating is the increased incidence of financial crises in EMEs in the era of unfettered global finance -until the early 2000s. Instead of gaining in efficiency and stability the experience of EMEs is scattered with gravely disruptive financial crises, often leaving permanent structural and socioeconomic scars in their trail (Ocampo and Stiglitz 2008) . For what actually happens when a country opens up to global finance and becomes the target of capital flows is currency appreciation and a corresponding loss in competitiveness (Combes, Kinda, and Plane 2011) . It is in this way that a current account deficit arises that makes the target country of private capital flows a recipient of foreign saving (in the ex-postnational income accounting sense). In a self-fulfilling and ultimately destabilizing fashion, rising asset prices and currency appreciation arouse herding among foreign investors financing the boom.
Lured by higher prospective rates of return than seem available in home markets, risks may appear low for a while, especially since liberalized financial markets promise the option of getting out at any time. Typically, it is consumption spending (by the privileged few) rather than investment that gets stimulated through currency appreciation and rising asset prices -at least temporarily. Fragile financial structures and vulnerabilities build up through rising indebtedness as the bonanza runs its course and bubbles inflate -until they burst.
Essentially, financial globalization means that the liberalizing developing country is losing both monetary policy autonomy and control over its financial system. Monetary policy space is lost as the EME can no longer pursue a monetary policy course that deviates from the global stance without risking provoking capital flows and exchange rate movements that might counteract its own policy intentions. At the same time, global financial conditions become freely transmittable to the domestic financial system through cross-border flows and dealings.
The point is that there may be very good reasons for preventing the free transmission and arbitraging of financial conditions set elsewhere in the global economy, precisely because these conditions may not be equally appropriate for every country. Similarly, there may be very good reasons for countries not to be subjected to a monetary policy stance determined externally. Far from being an optimum currency area, subjecting the world economy to uniform monetary and financial conditions makes little sense.
The promise of floating exchange rates as safeguarding countries' policy space heroically presumes that well-behaved market forces would guarantee continuous international equilibrium (Friedman 1953 , Johnson 1969 ). The evidence is otherwise: exchange rate movements neither compensate for inflation differentials, except for in the very long run, nor do floating currencies enjoy the degree of freedom under financial globalization implied by the "unholy trinity" (Tobin 1974 , Edison 1987 , Rogoff 1996 , Taylor 2004 While these reflections on the global monetary and financial order already indicate that financial globalization may be a thoroughly bad idea, it is useful to investigate some broad trends and episodes since the rise in global finance in the 1990s. ss to export in the periphery has important systemic implications, for it magnifies deflationary tendencies at the core and requires the reserve currency issuer to "overspend" (i.e., benignly neglect its current account deficit). This is the feedback loop through international trade mentioned above. Labor market weakness calls the Federal Reserve into action, enticing the needed (over-)spending.
In turn, easy monetary conditions set at the center of the global financial system also provide the key push factor for capital flows. Similar to the first wave of the 1990s, the second capital flow bonanza headed toward EMEs, too, arose in an environment of easy money policies by the US Federal Reserve -prompted by cyclical weakness in the US economy. Feeding the periphery's bloated self-insurance buffer, official recycling of private capital flows allows the extraction of a "premium" on the part of the reserve currency issuer (see below). 2 The notion "exorbitant privilege," as applied to the reserve currency issuer in the pre-financial globalization era, referred to the goods and services (trade deficit) or direct investments (private FDI outflows) enjoyed or acquired by the reserve currency issuer that had low-yielding official reserve holdings in the periphery as their counterpart. Financial globalization has expanded the opportunities for rent extraction on the basis of much larger gross capital flows meeting increased demands for safety in the periphery (Bibow 2010a) . Typically, self-insurance reserve buffers imply the payment of a "premium" by self-insuring recipient countries. For instance, if the reserve currency is used as carry-trade funding currency, the intervening authorities in the recipient country effectively act as counterparty in these carry-trades, paying a "carry-trade premium" to the carry traders. ll shortr.
WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
EME's options and their relative merit depend on global developments, the global monetary and financial order in particular. Enhancing collective insurance represents a straight forward way of making recourse to self-insurance less attractive. After all, the IMF's core mandate features the provision of temporary financing to countries in balance of payments crisis. In the quiet years prior to the global crisis, the IMF seemed to be going out of business though (Kapur and Webb 2006) . The widespread shift in current account balances and surging reserve holdings reflected
EMEs' urge to avoid conditionality of emergency loans. IMF stand-by arrangements have made a comeback with the GFC in countries that had taken out insufficient self-insurance.
At the London G-20 summit in April 2009, the IMF's lending powers were trebled. The
Fund doubled its general loan access limits for nonconcessional lending to 200 percent of quota per year and 600 percent cumulatively, and revamped its lending framework. A new "Flexible
Credit Line" (FLC) instrument was launched, relying on ex ante rather than ex post conditionality, and a "Precautionary Credit Line" (PLC) was similarly designed as a precautionary lending facility for countries that do not quite meet strict ex ante conditionality, but qualify for "streamlined" ex post conditionality. While access to the FLC is determined on a discretionary basis by individual country financing needs, the PLC features a 10-times-quota access limit (see IMF 2009 IMF , 2010c . So far the new precautionary loan facilities have only met lackluster take-up. Pale in size compared to official reserve holdings of many emerging-market countries, they apparently represent insufficiently attractive collective alternatives to selfinsurance.
As the Fund continues its internal reflection process and considers further reforms, this could raise the demand for the collective insurance services it was originally set up to provide (IMF 2010a,b) . This is all the more important in view of the Fund's broadened surveillance responsibilities that now include regular and mandatory financial stability assessments for members with systemically important financial sectors as well as "spill-over reports" (IMF 2010d , UN 2011 . Resolution by mutual accord is complicated by the fact that key players seem to fundamentally disagree on the underlying causes of unbalanced global economic trends and the role of economic policy (UNCTAD 2010).
Reining in global finance represents another option for the global community to reduce the risk of financial instability, and thereby also the demand for self-insurance. Beliefs in market "self-regulation" have indeed lost in popularity and certain initiatives to that effect are under way, both at the global and national (or regional) levels. As agreed at the London G-20 Summit, a newly established "Global Stability Board" (GSB) has replaced the Global Stability Forum Implementation of reforms is still ongoing. There is growing resistance from interest groups, as many big players have grown even bigger since the global crisis.
Overall, it seems questionable whether these initiatives will sufficiently tame global finance and reduce EMEs' potential vulnerabilities arising from financial globalization. Reforms are merely adapting the pre-existing institutional framework without fundamentally challenging its intellectual presuppositions. Even if financial stability at the core improved, even bigger gambles might be put on when operating on EME turf, outside the purview of G-20 supervisors.
With no fundamental reform of the global order in sight, recourse to self-insurance strategies remains EMEs' default option. The crisis experience may further encourage this response. Some rather disconcerting facts exist though; to begin with, self-insuring countries
were not spared infection and turmoil but, as innocent bystanders, got hit and participated in the global crisis. In the event, self-insurance merely provided some margin of safety enabling countries to avoid IMF rescue and securing some -varying -policy space for implementing countercyclical policies on their own (Bibow 2010b ).
Next, while only of limited effectiveness, self-insurance comes at a significant cost.
Essentially, self-insurance has EMEs swap ownership of higher-yielding assets for loweryielding ones (Bibow 2008-9) . This swap represents a nice bargain for international investors, even more so today when the monetary authorities in core advanced countries pursue "zero interest rate policies." For recipient EMEs the ballooning volume of currency market interventions (and sterilization measures) required for containing upward currency pressures is raising the stakes. Failure to contain currency appreciation means being pushed back into the pre-1999 external deficit position; risking boom-bust cycles while stepping up their efforts through self-insurance means boosting the transfer of resources to rich countries (Bibow 2010a) .
Finally, there is the important systemic issue that EMEs' pursuit of self-insurance requires a counterparty willing to underwrite insurance on demand. Essentially, reserve buffers provide some limited but costly protection, and without solving the underlying issue, which can only be addressed at the global level by reforming the global monetary order. 7 EMEs should explore CAM as an alternative to self-insurance.
CAPITAL ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT: RATIONALE AND PRINCIPLES
Rather than waiting for proper global reform while continuing to passively adapt to policies set at the center with only limited policy space reclaimed through costly self-insurance, EMEs may aim at keeping out what they do not need, namely through a CAM regime. IMF regulations actually allow for this possibility. OECD and EU regulations as well as bilateral agreements may present more of an obstacle. Arguably, flawed doctrines and vested interests are the most important hurdles to overcome.
The aims of a CAM regime are threefold. The first objective is to safeguard financial stability by reducing exposure to unfettered global finance. Experience shows that global finance is far from benevolent and well-behaved. EMEs have every reason to contain risks arising from capital inflows that do not serve their development. The second objective is to safeguard macroeconomic stability and enlarge policy space. Given that the world is not an optimal currency area, delinking from global monetary and financial conditions as set at the 7 Regional pooling and lending arrangements among EMEs can only help limiting instabilities that arise within the region, but not extra-regional shocks hitting the whole region.
center is the essence of the exercise. The third objective is to avoid the costs that arise by relying on self-insurance rather than CAM in the pursuit of the first two objectives.
Note that the proposal here is for a permanent rather than a temporary regime and that the focus is on capital inflows rather than outflows. 8 Instead of blocking flighty outflows when crisis strikes, it makes far more sense to prevent financial vulnerabilities from arising in the first place, namely by blocking types of inflows that can easily turn flighty (Goodhart and Delargy 1998) . So the regime is to be selective as well, with CAM concerning both the composition of inflows as well as their aggregate volume (Bibow 2008-9) .
The "saving gap" idea is the key doctrinal flaw behind the financial globalization mantra. The mainstream (neoclassical) vision of capital accumulation has saving causing and somehow financing investment. This vision is utterly confused and thoroughly misleading. In monetary production economies capital is not saved and grown, but produced, with production requiring advance finance that allows paying the factors of production in monetary units before the output can be sold. Capital formation thus requires liquidity, as created and allocated by the financial system, rather than (ex ante) saving. "We have all been brought up … in deep confusion of mind between the demand and supply of money and the demand and supply of savings; and until we rid ourselves of it, we cannot think correctly," as Keynes (1939) astutely observed on this crucial matter (see also Bibow 2009 , Borio and Disyatat 2011 , UNCTAD 2006 . The enlightened Keynesian vision therefore stresses that, while growth and development require investment, investment is driven by aggregate demand which, in turn, is susceptible to macroeconomic policies. In the context of developing countries in a globalized world, it is capital goods rather than "capital" that may need to be imported. Any need for external finance of domestic investment only arises if imports cannot be paid for by exports.
Sufficient policy space for deliberate macroeconomic management in line with domestic requirements is thus vital. It is the lack of policy space entailed by financial globalization which tends to bias macroeconomic policies of EMEs towards (net) exports rather than domestic demand as their driver of growth. Ideally both fiscal and monetary policies should be tuned so as to be conducive to steady domestic demand growth, complemented by a competitive exchange rate that allows for the "payment" of imports by means of exports. In practice financial globalization relegates monetary policy to the passive adaptation to conditions set at the center. While self-insurance may recapture some limited space for monetary policy, fiscal policy, too, tends to get subordinated to external conditions as (net) exports take on a superficially prominent role in aggregate demand.
Importantly, criticizing export-led growth strategies for their neo-mercantilist character is beside the point when policies are chosen defensively as EMEs try to protect themselves against the hazardous environment that the international monetary (non-)order joined by unfettered global finance is posing to their development. That said, the relative success of neomercantilism in EMEs certainly undermines the "saving gap" idea, which is contradicted by evidence showing that "developing countries that have relied less on foreign finance have grown faster in the long run" (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian 2007) . It does not take tapping any foreign saving pool to grow and catch up. But it is indeed curious that development should come along with an uphill resource transfer, which is precisely what the current neoliberal global order is extracting from developing countries (cf. UN 2011).
The "wise finance" idea behind the financial globalization mantra does not hold up to scrutiny either. Financial globalization allegedly improves institutions and practices in countries with underdeveloped financial markets, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources.
While compelling empirical evidence in support of such "indirect benefits" does not exist, the point to emphasize here is that the alleged gains do not require hot money for their delivery anyway.
Essentially, a CAM regime can be designed that refocuses the activities of central banks (and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)) in such a way as to capture the alleged microeconomic efficiency gains while avoiding the premium that is attached to self-insurance. Properly designed, any microeconomic benefits supposedly arising from hot money flows as the transmitters of foreign expertise may still be obtained even when blocking those very inflows. Foreign expertise may play various functions in the proposed CAM regime. For instance, the asset management of the GDFs may in principle be left to the very same fund managers that currently steer the foreign portfolio investments on behalf of foreign investors;
and, for the sake of the argument, they might even be rewarded for their expertise by unchanged fee structures. Assuming that it makes sense to import their expert services to serve allocative efficiency, the point is that there is no need to import these services on the back of hot money inflows as footloose drivers of domestic liquidity creation. The potential role for foreign expertise may extend to advising the central bank on monetary policy and the financial stability authorities on financial regulation and supervision. Regarding the GDFs' management, foreign expertise may be partly acquired through services import or direct investments, if that serves industry competition. The key point is that the liabilities structure of the GDFs has domestic ownership, effectively replacing foreign ownership of high-yielding EME assets appearing on the liabilities side of the EMEs' IIP under the current self-insurance regime. Under the proposed CAM regime, the EME would pay for imported services and any earnings on direct investments, but it would no longer be burdened by the implicit price tag of self-insurance.
The initial equity capital in the GDFs will be to the Treasury (on taxpayers' behalf).
Managing the GDFs' liability structures (leverage) might include a role for the central bank and the financial stability authority. While produced at home in any case, liquidity creation can be steered in a more controlled fashion when the central bank enjoys the necessary policy space.
The role of the EME authorities thus changes fundamentally. The central bank will no longer passively adapt its policy stance to conditions set at the center and have its liquidity policies driven by sterilization needs. Instead, with decoupling through CAM, the central bank can autonomously determine a monetary policy stance as warranted by domestic requirements.
Domestic credit rather than reserve assets are the counterpart to monetary base growth.
The key principles of the proposed CAM regime may then be spelled out. Ideally, only foreign direct investment inflows that match the recipient countries' development goals should be allowed in. Selection may be stricter still in focusing on Greenfield investment only. If merger and acquisition inflows are believed to serve the transfer of foreign knowhow and management skills, a higher than 10 percent hurdle may be set so as to block disguised "hot money" (portfolio equity) inflows. Beyond concurrent FDI outflows and reasonable reserve accumulation the volume of qualifying FDI inflows determines the maximum size of any safely tolerable current account deficit. In this regard, CAM is similar to self-insurance, a different means toward the same end.
Limiting the current account deficit is first of all a risk containment policy. Reliance on non-FDI inflows represents a hazardous gamble better to be avoided. Hot money-type private capital inflows primarily result in either reduced policy space-cum-financial fragility risks, or in bloated reserve holdings together with wasteful self-insurance premium payments. Setting up a CAM regime and redesigning SWFs as GDFs avoids these downsides while retaining any potential benefits associated with special expertise that may be in short supply domestically.
It is misleading to associate a current account deficit with increased investment "financed by" foreign saving. Rather, the current account balance is an indicator of a country's intertemporal consumption profile. In practice, a current account deficit may allow increased present consumption, but future consumption will be constrained by the impact of capital inflows on net investment income over time. Of course this trade-off also applies to FDI, but FDI is at least likely to contribute to the recipient country's technological advancement and catching up, so that future incomes will be higher too, whether or not FDI actually means an increased investment rate. If a higher investment rate is the policy goal, this may be more reliably achieved by fostering domestic investment spending directly (which in turn may warrant higher exports to the extent that capital goods are imported). By definition, investment means foregoing present consumption. Ironically, countries that really cannot forego present consumption typically have no access to global finance anyway, and hence must rely on official development aid only.
The current account balance also indicates the balance of growth stimuli a country derives from domestic demand versus net exports. History actually features some rather successful cases of countries running persistent current account surpluses during their fast catching-up phase (Germany, Japan, and China are examples). Section 2 argued that the popularity of the "export-led growth" model with its policy focused on competitiveness represents a policy response to the hazards of financial globalization-a revealed preference for safety in the periphery that also has systemic implications. Enabling countries to manage domestic demand is a precondition for severing their reliance on export-led growth. CAM may therefore also be an effective way to discourage mercantilist (cum self-insurance) strategies.
Given the aim of blocking hot money, the regime specifics and peculiar CAM techniques applied should be designed to suit countries' specific structures and circumstances. But other factors, too, played a role in enlarging China's policy space. One important factor is that China has maintained very low inflation rates (at times deflation) while pursuing growth-oriented monetary policies; incomes policies have kept wages and productivity growth aligned (Flassbeck 2005) . China thereby avoided larger interest rate differentials and correspondingly stronger incentives for hot money capital inflows. China's favorable fiscal position at the outset of the GFC, not unrelated to its external surplus, offered the fiscal space to launch a large stimulus package.
12 Export surpluses had ballooned in the years prior to the crisis, but China has clearly started to rebalance away from export dependence since (Bibow 2010c) .
Finally, despite the country's huge foreign reserves, China's CAM regime has helped to keep the costs of self-insurance at bay. Since only a small part of China's reserves was sourced from hot money inflows, the wasteful resource transfer resulting from inherently useless inflows was correspondingly small as well. China's CAM regime may be a model for other EMEs to follow.
India
The balance of payments crisis of 1991 marks a watershed in India's economic policies. The crisis prompted an IMF structural adjustment program that included liberalization of the current and capital accounts. Prior to the crisis, official and private debt inflows provided the main sources of external finance. Since the crisis, India has aimed at blocking debt inflows, especially short-term ones. By contrast, India has gradually opened up to equity inflows, both FDI and portfolio, and more recently also began to relax restrictions on FDI outflows by Indian corporations. Portfolio inflows are managed through a "Foreign Institutional Investment" framework that requires registry of eligible foreign investors. 
CONCLUSION
The ideological push for capital account liberalization presupposes a "saving gap" in the developing world to be closed by capital flows. In truth, catching-up in EMEs does not even require foreign saving. Certainly tolerating current account deficits beyond (net) FDI inflows is primarily hazardous, as compellingly evidenced by financial crises in EMEs. Limiting current account deficits through currency intervention and reserve accumulation is not costless either.
The self-insurance boom of the 2000s has contributed to the perverse resource transfer from poor to rich. Allowing access to unwarranted hot money flows only to park the destabilizing inflows in low-yielding reserve assets highlights that rent extraction is at the heart of financial globalization -as one aspect of the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of (net) capital flows from poor to rich. The analysis shows that any indirect benefits attributed to financial globalization as improving efficiency in resource allocation may be "synthesized" by a CAM regime that turns SWFs into GDFs. The first phase of financial globalization was characterized by fragilities and crises originating in EMEs. As defensive macroeconomic policies became en vogue in EMEs in the second phase, fragilities shifted to the core of the global financial system (still enjoying rent extraction engineered through financial globalization). The experience calls for a fundamental policy reorientation: globalization needs to be managed, especially capital flows. Financial globalization beyond FDI flows is simply not advisable.
With proper reform of the international monetary and financial order unlikely at this point, CAM offers three major advantages to developing countries. First, it creates macropolicy space by decoupling from the monetary policy stance set at the center. Second, it avoids financial vulnerabilities arising from unfettered global finance. Third, it avoids the costs associated with bulging reserve holdings sourced from unwarranted capital inflows. For the world at large there is the additional advantage that CAM reduces the incentive for defensive macroeconomic policies on the part of the periphery-and thereby also its systemic counterpart: the need for "overspending" by the lead country.
Studying the BRICs broadly covers the spectrum of CAM regimes in place. CAM contributed to China's resistance to and ability to swiftly overcome the GFC, an open capital account to Russia's heightened vulnerability and inability to overcome the crisis by domestic means. Traditionally cautious with regard to global finance, India has increased its external vulnerability in recent times through liberalization and toleration of larger current account
